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Summary  findings
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo argue that the recent  The government cannot prevent a speculative attack
Asian currency crisis was caused by large prospective  but it can affect its timing. The longer the delay, the
fiscal deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees  higher inflation will be under flexible exchange rates.
to failing banking systems.  The authors present empirical evidence in support  of
They articulate this view using a simple dynamic  the two key assumptions of their model:
general equilibrium model, whose key feature is that a  * Large losses in the banking sector were associated
speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of  with large increases in Asian governments' prospective
future government deficits rises. This is true regardless of  deficits.
the government's  foreign reserves position or the initial  * The public knew that the banks were in trouble
level of its debt.  before the currency crisis.
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Recent events in Asia have renewed interest  in the causes and  consequences of
speculative attacks  on fixed exchange rate regimes. The explanation preferred by
policy makers in Asia is that  the  currency crisis was a  self fulfilling prophecy:
it happened  because speculators thought  it was going to happen.'  Not surpris-
ingly, proponents of this view argue that  the International  Monetary Fund should
provide resources to fend off such predatory  attacks  and help prey countries re-
cover from them.  Multiple equilibrium models of currency crises can be used to
rationalize this interpretation  of recent events in Asia. 2
The most natural  alternative explanation of the Asian currency crisis is that
it reflected profligate fiscal policy: ongoing fiscal deficits led to sustained reserve
losses and  to  the  eventual abandonment  of fixed exchange rates.  This  is the
standard view of speculative attacks in 'first generation' models of currency crises.
To articulate this view, the speculative attacks literature  focuses on two types of
policy experiments:  (i) an  increase in the fiscal deficit that  must  eventually be
monetized; 3 and (ii) an exchange rate peg that is unsustainable because it reduces
the government's seignorage revenues without  compensating fiscal adjustments.4
Both  experiments imply that  the  collapse of a fixed exchange rate  is preceded
by ongoing deficits and  rising debt levels.  This  has  motivated  a large body  of
empirical work aimed at predicting currency crises on the basis of fiscal deficits
and other macroeconomic aggregates. 5
The  standard  explanation  for speculative attacks  has  an  obvious shortcom-
'Radelet  and Sachs  (1998)  also  take this perspective  in addition  to arguing  that the actions
of the IMF exacerbated  the crises.
2See  for example  Obstfeld  (1986a,  1996),  and Sachs,  Tornell  and Velasco  (1996).
3See for example  Krugman  (1979),  Flood  and Garber  (1984),  Obstfeld  (1986b),  and Calvo
and  V6gh (1998).
4See for example Calvo (1987) and Wijnbergen  (1991).
'For  a recent example see Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart  (1996).
2ing when applied to Asia: governments of the crisis countries (Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and  Thailand) were running either  surpluses or small
deficits.  This evidence notwithstanding,  we argue that  the Asian currency crises
were caused by fundamentals:  large prospective deficits associated with implicit
bailout guarantees  to failing banking systems. The expectation  that  these future
deficits would (at least in part) be financed by seignorage revenues led to a collapse
of the fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia. 6 Of course market participants  could
have believed that  governments would fund their obligations by raising taxes or
lower expenditures.  But is this credible?  In our view it is not.  The state  of the
world in which financial intermediaries would suffer grievous losses is exactly the
state  of the world in which current and prospective real output  and tax revenues
would fall. While not  modeled in this  paper, raising distortionary  taxes or low-
ering government purchases under those  circumstances could well be politically
unacceptable  or socially undesirable relative to  the alternative:  monetizing the
prospective deficits and receiving aid from international  agencies like the Inter-
national  Monetary Faund. But this  alternative  is incompatible with  maintaining
fixed exchange rates.  In this  sense, our view of recent events in Asia is related
to  'second generation'  speculative attack  models which stress that  governments
consider the costs and benefits of abandoning fixed exchange rate regimes. 7
To articulate our view of the Asian currency crisis, sections 2 and 3 of the paper
study  the  dynamics of a speculative attack  in a variant  of the perfect foresight
small open economy models considered by Calvo (1987) and Drazen and Helpman
(1987,1988). The key difference between our analysis and theirs is the nature  of
the monetary experiment that  we analyze. To capture  the effect of a prospective
6Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998b)  also discuss  the possible  role played by expectations
of future seignorage  revenues  in the Asian currency crises. They do so under the assumption
that  the  affected countries faced a limit on the ratio of total  private foreign debt  to government
reserves.
7See Obstfeld  (1994) and  references therein.
3deficit on a fixed exchange rate regime we assume that  at time 0 agents receive
information that  future deficits will be larger than  they originally believed. The
government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint  implies that  a speculative  attack
is inevitable.  This  is true  regardless of the  government's initial level of foreign
reserves or its initial debt position.  Once the government learns that  the present
value of future deficits has risen, the only choices left to it are when and how to
raise the seignorage revenues required to meet its intertemporal budget constraint.
We analyze the date of a speculative attack, i.e. the date at which the economy
switches from a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime, under two assumptions.
First, we assume that  the government follows a threshold rule according to which
the fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned in the first period that net government
debt reaches some exogenous upper bound.  Second, we consider the case in which
the only constraint faced by the government is its intertemporal budget constraint.
In both  cases we depart  from the speculative attack  literature  by distinguishing
between the time of the speculative attack and the time at which the government
implements the new monetary policy required to balance its intertemporal budget
constraint.  Disentangling  these two events considerably enriches the  dynamic
implications of the model.
Using versions of the model calibrated  to Korean and Thai data,  we show in
Section 4 that  the speculative attack  occurs after the  information about  higher
future  deficits arrives but  before the new monetary  policy is implemented.  An
econometrician looking at  the  data  would see an  exchange rate  crisis - but  he
would not see large deficits, high growth rates of money or high rates of inflation
prior to the speculative attack.  The econometrician could well conclude that  the
attack was a multiple equilibrium phenomenon.  In fact it reflects fundamentals:
high prospective deficits.
While  the government cannot  prevent a speculative  attack,  it  can affect its
4timing  by borrowing.  The  cost of delaying is higher future  inflation once the
speculative  attack  takes place.  This  raises the  issue of what  monetary  policy
the government should pursue.  Section 5 shows that  in our  simple model, the
optimal policy is to  abandon fixed exchange rates as soon as information about
higher prospective deficits arrives. Since this result reflects, in part,  the absence
of nominal rigidities in our model, it serves primarily  to highlight  the  costs of
delaying a speculative  attack.  In reality, these costs must  be  counterbalanced
against the benefits (if any) of delaying.
Section 6 offers empirical evidence in support  of the two key assumptions in
our model:  (i) large losses in the banking sector are associated  with  increases
in governments' prospective deficits; and  (ii) the public knows that  banks are in
trouble before the exchange rate crisis occurs.  To address (i) we use information
on pre and post currency crisis loan default rates to  generate rough estimates of
governments'  total  implicit liabilities to the financial sector.  To address  (ii) we
construct and analyze stock market based measures of the value of financial and
nonfinancial sectors in the crisis countries. We find strong evidence that  in Korea,
Thailand,  and  to a lesser extent  Malaysia and the Philippines,  the value of the
financial sector had been declining, in both absolute and relative terms, well before
their  currency crises. Coupled with the institutional  information summarized by
Corsetti,  Pesenti and  Roubini (1998a), IMF  (1998) and  Lane et al (1999), this
constitutes  strong evidence in favor of assumption (ii). Finally, Section 7 presents
concluding remarks and discusses some shortcomings of our analysis.
2.  A  Benchmark  Model
In this Section we describe a continuous time, perfect foresight endowment econ-
omy populated  by an infinitely lived representative agent and a government. All
agents, including the government, have access to  international  capital  markets.
5The  government  faces  a  standard  present  value  budget  constraint  and  finances
expenditures  through  lump  sum  taxes,  seignorage  revenues  and  borrowing.
There  is a  single consumption  good  in the  economy  and  no  barriers  to trade,
so that  purchasing  power parity  holds:
Pt =  StPt  (2.1)
Here  Pt  and  Pt* denote  the  domestic  and  foreign  price  level  respectively,  while
St  denotes  the  exchange  rate  (defined  as units  of domestic  currency  per  unit  of
foreign  currency).  For convenience  we assume  that  Pt* =  1.
2.1.  The  Representative  Agent
The  representative  agent  maximizes  lifetime  utility,  defined  as:
f;  1-  e-P dt  (2.2)
Here  ct  denotes  consumption,  p is a  strictly  positive  discount  factor,  and  a  >  0
is the  inverse  of the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution.  The  representative
agent  can  borrow  and  lend  in  international  capital  markets  at  a  constant  real
interest  rate  r.  To eliminate  trends  in the  current  account  we  assume  that  r  = p.
The  representative  agent's  flow budget  constraint  is given by:
Abt + z\dt  =  -Amt  if t  E I,
bt + it  =  y + r(bt + dt) + v -Ct -T-7rtnt  - Tt  if t 0  I.  (23
Here bt and  dt denote  real  domestic  government  debt  and  net  foreign  assets  held
by  the  representative  agent,  respectively,  y denotes  the  constant  exogenous  en-
dowment  of output,  v denotes  the  constant  level of lump  sum  transfers  from  the
government,  -r denotes  the  constant  level of lump  sum taxes,  and  7rt  is the inflation
rate.  The  variable  mt  represents  real  money  balances,  defined  as  mt  =  Mt/Pt,
where  Mt  denotes  nominal  money  holdings.  Throughout  the  paper  St  denotes  d-
6Note that,  as in Drazen and Helpman (1987), the household's budget constraint
(2.3) takes into account the possibility of discrete changes in mt, dt, and bt at a
finite set of points in time, I.  The flow budget constraint,  together with the con-
ditions  lim  e-rtbt =lim  e-rtdt  0=  , implies the following intertemporal  budget
constraint  for the household:
bo  + do  = j  e-rt [ct  + T  - y - v +  mrtmt  +  it]dt+  E  CrAmi.  (2.4)
iEI
According to  (2.4), the present value of the representative  agent's expenditures,
inclusive of taxes and transfers, must equal the present value of endowment income
plus initial net assets.
Finally, the agent faces the following continuous time  analogue to a  cash in
advance constraint  on consumption purchases:
ct  mt.  (2.5)
Since the nominal interest  rate  is positive in all the scenarios that  we consider,
(2.5) holds with strict equality.8
The problem of the representative  household is to maximize (2.2) subject  to
(2.3) and  (2.5) by choice of time paths  for ct, mt, bt and dt, subject  to  a known
time path for Pt.  In the Appendix we show that  the first order conditions for this
problem imply:
c7  = A(1  + r +  7rt),  (2.6)
'This  continuous  time  cash-in-advance  model is the  limit,  as  the  length  of the  period,  n,
goes to  zero of  a  discrete  time  economy in which  preferences  are  given  by  U  =  Z=o(l  +
np) -t/nn(c  -e  _1)/(  1-a),  the  resource  constraint  is bt-bt-n  = ny+nrbt-n-nct  + Mt-./Pt-
Mt/Pt  and  the  cash-in-advance  constraint  is Mt/Pt  >  ct.  Note  that  if the  cash-in-advance
constraint  was of the  form Mt/Pt  > nct  then  money would be neutral  as n  -O  0 since, in the
limit, transactions  could be carried out without  using money.
7where A  is the current-valued Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.3). Equation
(2.6) will play a central role in our derivations.
2.2.  The  Government
The government purchases goods, g, makes transfer payments, v, levies lump sum
taxes, T,  and may borrow at the real interest rate r.  In addition, the government
can print money. The government's flow budget constraint is given by:
Aft-Abt  =  Amt  if t eI  2.7
ft-bt=T-g-  v+r(ft-bt)+?ht+7rtmt  if t¢I.  (2  .)
In this equation ft  represents the government's real net foreign assets.'  The flow
budget constraint together with the conditions  lim e-rtft  = lim e-rtbt = 0, imply
t-.o  t  *00
the following intertemporal  budget constraint  for the government:
bo -fo  =j  e-rt(-  g  - v + Tht  + irtmt)dt +  E  e-"'Ami.  (2.8)
According to  this condition,  the present value of future  surpluses including the
value of seignorage revenues must equal the value of the government's net initial
debt.
2.3.  A Competitive  Equilibrium
A competitive perfect foresight equilibrium for this economy is a set of allocations
ct, mt, bt + dt, a set of prices Pt and St, and a set of paths for the fiscal variables,
Tt,  gt and vt, such that  the following  conditions hold: (i) ct, mt, bt + dt solve the
household's  problem given the paths for Pt, St,  Tt  and vt  (ii) the government's
9It is common in the  literature  to divide ft  into two components:  ft  =  f1t  + ft  r,where  ftr
and  ft"  denote the  government's  net  foreign exchange reserves and  the  remaining  net  foreign
assets  in the  government portfolio,  respectively.  Note that  if ft  and  bt yield the  same rate  of
return,  they enter the  government's flow budget  constraint  symmetrically.  So given values for r
and g, and a path  for mnt  the model can only determine the  time path  of the  government's  total
debt:  bt -ft.
8intertemporal  budget  constraint  (2.8) holds;  and  (iii) St = Pt for  all  t.  Note  that
this  definition  applies  to  an  economy  operating  under  either  a  fixed  or a flexible
exchange  rate  equilibrium.
2.4.  A  Sustainable  Fixed  Exchange  Rate  Regime
In  a  sustainable  fixed  exchange  rate  regime  agents  anticipate  zero  inflation  and
(2.6) reduces  to:
c-  =  A(1 + r),  (2.9)
implying  that  consumption  is  constant  over  time.  The  budget  constraint  (2.4)
implies  that:
c =  r(bo + do) + r f  e-rt(y  + v - -r)dt.  (2.10)
In this  equilibrium,  the  money  supply  is endogenous.  Purchasing  power parity
(2.1),  and  the  cash in advance  constraint  (2.5) imply  that  the  equilibrium  level of
the  money  supply  is:
M  = Sc.  (2.11)
So in a sustainable  fixed exchange  rate  regime,  the  money  supply  is constant  and
the  present  value  of current  and  future  real  surpluses  equals  the initial  real  net lia-
bilities  of the  government:  no seignorage  revenues  are available  to the  government.
In our  model  economy,  seignorage  revenues  can  be generated  only  if the  country
abandons  the  fixed exchange  rate  regime.'"  In a fixed  exchange  rate  regime,  the
government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint  (2.8) simplifies  to:
rOO
bo-  fo  =  ]  e-r(r  - g - v)dt.  (2.12)
"0If there  were  growth  in P*  or in consumption,  the  government  would  collect  some seignorage
revenue  under  fixed  exchange  rates.
93.  Exchange  Rate  Crises
Suppose that  at time  0 agents learn that  there has been an  increase, 4, in the
present value of the deficit due to a rise in future transfer payments.  Specifically,
we assume that  transfers  increase permanently after date T':
vt =v  forO0<t  <l',
t  vt>v  fort>T'.
To simplify we suppose that  taxes and  government purchases  remain  constant.
The increase in the government deficit is then given by:
= f  ert(vt  - v)dt.
The government's new budget constraint  is:
bo -fo  =  fo  e-'(T  - g -v)dt  (3.1)
-0  +  Jo  e-t(rit  + 7rtmt)dt +  Ze-riAmi.
Using equation  (2.12) this can be rewritten  as:
rJ  t  e-(mt  + 7rtmt)dt  +  E  e-ri Ami.  (3.2)
Since the  government must collect seignorage revenues it  must,  at some point,
abandon the fixed exchange regime.' 1
For simplicity we assume that  the government will raise the seignorage rev-
enues to balance its intertemporal  budget constraint  by a combination of a one
"tTo see this suppose that the economy never reverted to a flexible  exchange  rate regime.
Expected inflation  would  then be zero and the demand  for real balances would  remain  constant
over time.  What happens if the government  prints money to finance the deficit? Since there
is no demand for this money, agents will simply trade it for a different asset.  Regardless  of
whether this asset is domestic bonds, foreign  bonds or foreign reserves, the nominal money
supply will revert to its initial value. This means that no seignorage  revenue  has been raised by
the government.
10time increase in the stock of money at time T equal to AMT  and  growth in the
money supply at rate  it from period T on.  We denote the time period in which
the government abandons the fixed exchange rate regime by tV. To determine t*,
we must  make assumptions regarding the government's rule for abandoning the
fixed exchange rate  regime.
For now we proceed under  the assumption  that  the  government adopts  the
following threshold rule:  it abandons the fixed exchange rate  regime in the first
period t* when bt - ft  reaches T. A special case of this rule is typically used in
the speculative attack literature.  That special case emerges under the additional
assumption (which we do not make) that  the only component of the government's
portfolio  that  changes over time  is the  central bank's  foreign reserves.  Given
this  assumption,  a  threshold  rule on  net government  debt  is transformed  into
the threshold rule for reserves that  is often used in  the literature.' 2 In section
4.5 we discuss what  happens when the only constraint  on the government is its
intertemporal  budget  constraint  and  show that  none of the  key features  of our
results depends on the debt threshold rule assumption.
3.1.  Timing
To analyze how the economy reacts to the information about  higher prospective
deficits it is useful to distinguish between four intervals of time.
Time Interval 1: 0 < t < t*. This is the time interval after information about the
higher future deficits has arrived but before the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate regime. We denote the value of consumption, real balances and nominal
money supply in this interval of time by c, fm,  and M,  respectively.
" 2See for example Krugman (1978) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998). Exceptions  to this as-
sumption include Drazen and Helpman (1987, 1988)  and Wijnbergen  (1993).
11Time  Interval 2:  t* < t < T.  This is the time interval between the collapse of
the fixed exchange rate  regime and the  new steady state  flexible exchange
rate  equilibrium. We denote all variables that  are time varying during this
regime with  a  subscript  t  (e.g.  ct is consumption).  Variables which are
constant  during this time interval are denoted with a superscript  *.
Time Interval 3: T < t < I'.  This is the interval of time after the new monetary
policy has been implemented but  before the new level of transfers has been
adopted.  We denote all variables that  are constant during this time interval
with  a lower bar.
Time Interval  4: t >  T'.  This is the time interval after which the  new transfer
policy is implemented.  As with  time interval 3, we represent  all variables
that  are constant  during this interval with a lower bar.
3.2.  Computing  the  Time  of the  Speculative  Attack
In order  to  solve for the  time  of the speculative attack,  we must  compute  the
model's dynamic, perfect  foresight equilibrium.  In this  section, we describe the
key equations that  allow us to do this.
At  time 0, when information about  the new fiscal deficit arrives, the repre-
sentative agent  re-optimizes his consumption plan.  The value of the  Lagrange
multiplier associated with his intertemporal budget constraint jumps from A to A.
The consumption optimization condition for time interval 1 is,
(C)-a  =  A(1 + r), for 0 < t <  t*.  (3.3)
Since the government rebates the seignorage revenues in the form of lump sum
transfers,  the  present value of the resources available to the  consumer does not
change with the arrival of new information at time zero. However, given that  the
12rate of inflation will no longer be constant, consumption at time 0 will, in general,
be different from c. The cash in advance constraint is binding, so the time 0 value
of real balances must also jump from m = c to mh  = e. Since Pt = S before t* the
change in real balances is accomplished by a change in the nominal money supply
from M to M, where M  is given by:
M = SE.  (3.4)
The  change  in the  money supply  occurs as private  agents  adjust  the  amount
of domestic money, government debt  and foreign reserves that  they  hold.  For
example if M > M, agents increase real balances by selling government bonds, bt,
or foreign assets, dt for domestic money.
In the second time interval, the first order condition for consumption is:
Ct  =  1 + r +-n  ), for t* < t < T.  (3.5)
Since inflation jumps discretely at t*, so does consumption.  The path for St must
be continuous, so that  Pt. = S. Otherwise, given our assumption of perfect fore-
sight, there would be arbitrage opportunities associated with trading the currency
just  before and after Vt.
By assumption, net government debt at time t* rises to  IF:
b  ~  1~-M*)  M  M  r.-rett  36
t*  -ft.  ='I'  ~+  [bo  - fo +  e  +10  (g+ v-  )edt(36
f  ~  ~~S [°f  S  ]  9 
The last two terms of this equation represent the  accumulated government debt
up to tV. The term (M  - M)/S  represents the jump in the value of the debt that
takes place at time zero. The term (M  - M*)/S  represents the discrete, positive
increase in government debt that  takes place at Vt. This increase reflects the fact
that  agents trade domestic money, at the exchange rate  S, for either government
bonds or foreign assets.
13Equations  (3.3) and  (3.5) together  with  the  cash  in advance  constraint  imply:
(M  p  =1  (1 + r +  dPt  p  (3.7)
This  differential  equation  in Pt  can be written  as:
dPt  =  aPt1+  - bPt,  (3.8)
dt
a  =  (M*)-'(1  + r)eY,
b  =  (I+r).
The  solution  to  (3.8)  is:
Pt  b[a  (3.9)
Here  -y is a constant  of integration  determined  by the  condition  that  Pt  must  be
continuous  at  tO. This  requires  that  Pt.  = S  so (3.9)  can be  used  to  express  y as
a function  of t*:
a  = t*--b  ln(a  - bS-f).  (3.10)
ab
Equation  (3.9),  the  cash  in advance  constraint  at  time  T,  and  the  continuity  of
the  price  level at  T  (required  to prevent  arbitrage  opportunities)  imply  that:
PT  =T/  [a-e(T)ab]  (3.11)
The  level of consumption  in the  third  time  interval,  which  we denote  by  c, is
determined  by the  condition:
c-  =  A(1 + r + A), for t > T.  (3.12)
Solving equation  (3.11)  for -y and  using  equation  (3.10)  we find:
1  a  -bPs'
t*=  T  - -ln  ~~(.3
urb  a  bS-  (3.13)
14The value of t* depends on the magnitude of the deficit being financed (q),
the  monetary  policy used to  finance it,  and  the debt  threshold  4.  Since the
government increases the money supply at time T,  PT  will, in general, be greater
than  S. This  suggests that  t* <  T,  that  is, the  attack  takes  place  before the
new monetary  policy is implemented.  In fact this  is the case that  arises in the
calibrated versions of our model economy. However, there are two other cases to
consider: t  = 0, and t* > T.13
The first case, t* = 0, arises when MT  is large enough that  the rate of inflation
at time zero is higher than y.  The relatively high rate of inflation at time 0 induces
agents to lower their consumption thus creating a fall in money demand and a rise
in government debt.  If the rise in debt is large enough to trigger the threshold rule
then a speculative attack occurs immediately. The exchange rate will, in general,
be discontinuous at time 0. See Subsection 4.3 for further discussion.
The second case, t* >  T,  occurs for large values of  4i.  The  exchange rate
is still fixed at T  and  the endogenous level of the money supply is equal to  M.
With  a constant money supply no seignorage revenues are collected at T. Even
though the government prints money and buys back government bonds, the money
supply remains unaffected.  This is because private  agents reverse the effects of
the open market  operation by trading money for bonds.  The money supply only
changes at  t*, at  which point it drops to  M* = cS.  Thereafter  the  growth rate
of the money supply and the rate  of inflation are both  equal to  i.  The time of
the speculative  attack  is determined by the requirement  that  the  government's
intertemporal  budget constraint  (2.8) holds.
The final step in computing t* is to ensure that  c is consistent with the house-
hold's budget constraint,  (2.4) and that  monetary policy raises sufficient revenues
'3Equation  (3.13)  is only  valid  when  0  <  t*  < T.
15to balance the government's budget constraint:1 4
bfoM-M  +±10x  e(r  - g - vt)dt +  (3.14)
-M
S*  e-rt*  +
+ IT  e t(ktf)dt  + (c - cT)  e
The term  (c - cT)  represents the adjustment  in real balances that  takes place at
time T in response to the discontinuous decline in inflation to its new level, Ai.
It  is evident from (3.14) that  there is a continuum of  (MT,  j)  combinations
that  satisfy the government's budget constraint.  If we fix MT  we can then solve
for the values of c and y that  simultaneously solve (2.4) and  (3.2).  Proceeding
analogously we can fix p and solve for c and MT. Since it is not possible to carry
out these steps analytically we now turn to calibrated  versions of the model.
4.  Numerical  Experiments
Here we study the determinants of speculative attacks in versions of our the model
that  have been calibrated using Korean and Thai data.
4.1.  Model  Calibration
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values of our benchmark models. Throughout
we use  1996 as the  baseline period for time  series that  are sampled  at  annual
frequencies. In addition we normalize both output  and the time 0 exchange rate,
S, to be one.
" 4The seignorage collected between time t* and  time T,  ft. e-rt(rit  + 7rtmt)dt was omitted
from this  equation  because it is equal to zero.  This follows from the  fact  that  Mt  = O during
this interval of time and  from the  cash in advance constraint,  M* = Stct.
16Calibrating the Model Using Korea Data
We begin by discussing the debt and threshold rule parameters  bo, fo,  do, 0,
and 'Q.  The domestic and foreign debt levels of the public sector in our model were
calibrated using the consolidated debt levels of the Korean government and central
bank.  The Korean  Ministry of Finance (MOFE)  reports  that  the level of total
government and public sector bonds outstanding  at  the  end of December 1996
was equal to  approximately  37.4 trillion won. 15 According to the  International
Financial Statistics  (IFS) of the International  Monetary Fund  (IMF),  the Bank
of Korea held claims on the government equal to  2 trillion won as of the end of
December 1996. To avoid double counting, we subtracted  this number from the
reported  level of total  government and public sector bonds.  The IFS also reports
that  the Bank of Korea had net domestic liabilities (excluding those vis-a-vis the
government, official entities and  base money) of 4.7 trillion won.  Based on this
evidence, we conclude that  consolidated government domestic liabilities equaled
roughly 37.4-2+4.7  = 40.1 trillion won, or 10.3  percent of 1996 GDP. Accordingly
we set  bo =  0.103.
The Korea Institute  for International  Economic Policy (KIEP) estimated that
the foreign debt of the public sector in June  1997 was equal to 2.0 trillion won. 16
According to  the IFS, the value of the central bank's  net foreign assets was ap-
proximately 28.0 trillion won. This suggests that  the overall net foreign assets of
the consolidated public sector was equal to roughly 26.0 trillion won or 6.7 percent
of 1996 GDP. We set fo = 0.067 and bo  - fo =  0.036. According to the Bank of
Korea, the value of private sector net foreign debt at the end of 1996 was roughly
13.9 percent  of GDP. Accordingly we set do =-0.139.
'5This data  was obtained  from MOFE's  World Wide Web site, http://www.mofe.go.kr/.
16The data  are published on the Web at  http://kiep.go.kr.
17In Section 6 we argue that  the value of non-performing loans relative to GDP
prior  to  the crisis was roughly 0.25.  Taking this  to be  an  estimate  of the gov-
ernments implicit liabilities to the financial sector we set 0  =  0.25.  Since there
is substantial  uncertainty  about this number we explore the sensitivity of our re-
sults to perturbations  in Q. The benchmark value of P  was chosen to match  the
increase in consolidated government liabilities that  occurred in the  period lead-
ing up to  late October 1997 when the won first lost an unprecedented  (by recent
standards)  fraction of its value. Using data  from KIEP and the IFS, we estimate
that  net liabilities of the consolidated public sector rose to 5.3 percent  of GDP as
of the end of September  1997. Accordingly we set  I  = 0.053.  Later we explore
the sensitivity of our results to perturbations  in T.
We now discuss how the benchmark value of T was chosen. According to the
IMF World Economic Outlook, the ratio of government revenue to GDP in Korea
was roughly 22.0 percent in 1996. Since our model abstracts  from investment and
from the trade balance, we subtract  27.8 percent from output  to ensure that  the
consumption  to  output  ratio  in the  model matches  the 1996 value in  the data,
roughly 0.5.
We set the real interest rate, r, to the average ex-post real interest rate in Korea
for the period from January  1990 to April 1997, 7.45%. We chose the inverse of
the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution,  cr, to  be  equal to  1.0.  Finally, we
assume that  the average world rate of inflation, lr*, is 4 percent.  This corresponds
approximately to the average rate of inflation in the U.S. over the past 10 years. In
the theoretical model we assumed that  7r*  = 0. Allowing for a positive value of ir*
means that  the government will collect some revenue during the fixed exchange
rate  regime.  However, this  does not  change any of our conclusions since those
seignorage revenues have already been pledged to financing the  old level of the
deficit.
18Calibrating the Model to  Thai Data
According to the Bank of Thailand, total government domestic debt not held
by the central bank at the end of December 1996, was roughly 41.7 billion baht or
0.9 percent of GDP. We set bo  =  0.009.17  The Bank of Thailand  estimated  that
the foreign debt of the public sector in December 1996 was roughly equal to 430.2
billion baht.  According to  the IFS, net foreign assets of the Thai  central bank
equaled 988.6 billion baht in December 1996. This suggests that  the level of net
foreign assets of the consolidated public sector was equal to 558.4 billion baht or
12.1 percent of 1996 GDP. Thus, we set bo  - fo =  -0.112.  Using data  from the
Bank of Thailand we estimate  that  net foreign debt  of the private  sector at  the
end of 1996 was roughly 38.4 percent of GDP, so we set do = -0.384.'1
In Section 6 we argue that  a rough estimate  of the fiscal cost of the banking
bailout to be 30 percent of GDP, so we set 0 = 0.3. The parameter  I  was chosen
to match the decline in consolidated government assets that occurred in the period
leading up to the Thai  crisis in July 1997. We estimate that  during  this period
(until the end of June  1997), net  assets of the consolidated public sector fell to
7.5 percent of GDP. We set  1 =  -0.075.
According to the IMF World Economic Outlook, the ratio of government rev-
enue to  GDP in Thailand  was 18.9 percent in  1996. As in the  Korean case, we
subtracted  an additional 26.5 percent from output  to ensure that  the consump-
tion to output ratio in the model equaled the 1996 value of that  ratio in the data,
roughly 0.5.
" 7Bank  of  Thailand  data  was  obtained  from  their  World  Wide  Web  site  at
http://www.bot.or.th/.
'5This figure  was obtained  by taking  a standard measure  of total gross external debt, subtract-
ing public sector external debt, and then subtracting the foreign  assets of the banking system.
As in the Korean case, these are the only private sector foreign  assets for which information  is
generally  available.
19We set the real interest  rate, r, equal to the average ex-post real interest  rate
in Thailand for the period from January  1990 to April 1997, 4.2%. The remaining
parameter values are the same as in the Korean calibration.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter  Korea  Thailand  Description
Y  1  1  Real output
S  1  1  Time 0 exchange rate
bo  0.103  0.009  Time 0 government domestic debt
bo-  fo  0.036  -0.112  Time 0 net government debt
do  -0.139  -0.384  Time 0 private net foreign assets
0  0.25  0.30  Present  value of increase in deficit
T  0.053  -0.075  Upper limit on net government debt
r = p  0.0745  0.0420  Real interest  rate
r  0.22  0.19  Lump sum taxes
-i  1  1  Elasticity of intertemporal  substitution
T  3  3  Time of monetary policy change
-7r*  0.04  0.04  U.S. Inflation Rate
0.08  0.065  Growth rate of Mt after T
MT/M  1.10  1.10  Jump in Mt at T
4.2.  Results
Since the two calibrated versions of the model display very similar dynamics, we
focus our discussion on the Korean case. Figure 1 depicts the dynamic equilibrium
paths of ct (which  coincides  with mt),  7rt, Mt, bt  - ft and St (which  coincides  with
Pt) for the model calibrated  to the Korean data.  Two key features of Figure 1 are
worth noting. First,  the speculative attack occurs at t* = 2.27, before the change
in monetary  policy which occurs at T  = 3. For the Thai  case, t* = 2.42. Second,
inflation begins to increase at t*, well before the change in monetary policy. This
is reminiscent of classic results in Sargent and Wallace (1981) according to which
future monetary policy affects current inflation.
20We now turn  to the behavior of consumption.  In the benchmark  model con-
sumption increases discretely at time  zero (not displayed in Figure  1) to a level
that  is higher than  both  the old steady state  (c >  c) and the  new steady  state
reached after  T  (c  >  c).  The fact that  c  >  c results from two features  of the
equilibrium.  First,  since seignorage revenues are rebated  to the  household, the
present value of resources available to private agents is the same before and after
the increase in the government deficit. Second, since inflation is at its lowest value
before t*, the effective price of consuming during time interval 1 is lower than in
all other periods.  Figure 1 indicates that  during time interval 2 consumption de-
clines.  This reflects the rise in inflation relative to  time interval 1. During time
intervals 3 and  4 consumption is constant  because inflation is constant.  Notice
that  c > c because inflation is zero during time interval 1 but  positive during time
intervals 3 and 4.
Consider next the behavior of the money supply and government debt.  In the
initial steady state,  the level of the money supply is determined  by the  cash in
advance constraint  c = MIS.  At time 0, consumption jumps  from c to  c, while
the exchange rate remains constant.  It follows  that  the money supply must jump
from M to M = SE. Agents obtain the additional money needed for consumption
transactions  by trading  in foreign reserves or government bonds.  Consequently,
government debt drops discontinuously at time 0 (not displayed in Figure 1). FoT
the remainder of time interval 1 all model variables remain constant  except for
government debt which evolves according to:
bt-ft  =  [bo-fo-  S  ]m  et + |j(g  +  v-Tr)ertdt.  (4.1)
At time t* there is a discontinuous decrease in consumption which reflects the
jump  in inflation that  occurs at the onset of the  floating exchange rate  regime.
Since the exchange rate is still fixed at t* the cash in advance constraint  implies
21that  the  money  supply  falls  discontinuously  at  the  time  of the  attack.  Agents
exchange  domestic  money  for  foreign  reserves  or government  debt,  raising  total
government  liabilities  to  I.  It  is this  decline  in  domestic  money  holdings  that  is
often  described  as  a speculative  attack.
At  time  T,  the  new monetary  policy  is implemented  so  that  there  is a policy
induced  jump  in  MT  after  which  the  money  supply  grows  at  rate  ,u.  The  gov-
ernment  engineers  the  increase  in  MT  by  retiring  government  debt.  Before  the
new  transfer  policy  is implemented  at  T'  the  government  is  actually  running  a
surplus,  so that  government  debt  is declining.  After  T'  (not  displayed)  both  the
government  deficit  and  the  debt  begin  to  increase.
4.3.  Why  Doesn't  the  Attack  Take  Place  At  Time  Zero?
A fixed exchange  rate  regime  is a price  fixing scheme.  As long  as the  government
can borrow  enough  funds  it can support  a fixed price  for  its currency.  So the key
determinants  of t* are the  government's  ability  to borrow,  which  is determined  by
its intertemporal  budget  constraint,  its willingness to borrow,  which  is determined
by  T,  and  agent's  demand  for  domestic  money.  The  latter  demand  is  tied  to
agents'  optimal  consumption  path.  For  a  speculative  attack  to  occur  at  time  0
there  must  be  a  large  enough  drop  in  co to  trigger  the  threshold  rule  on  debt.
Since the  new monetary  policy  is only  implemented  at  T,  and  inflation  at  time  0
is actually  low relative  to  later  periods,  consumption  does  not  typically  drop  at
t  0=  . As noted  above  in the  benchmark  model  it actually  rises.
To provide  further  intuition  about  the  relation  between  consumption  and  ex-
change  rate  dynamics,  Figure  2 depicts  the  equilibrium  of the  model  if the  gov-
ernment  maintains  its  choice  of T,  MT  and  jt  but  abandons  fixed  exchange  rates
at  time  0 while  keeping  the  money  supply  at  some value MO until  time  T.  Figure
222 corresponds to the case where Mo = M.19
The  key feature  to  note is that  here the exchange rate  initially  appreciates
at  t  =  0.  This  is because  inflation is  lower at  time  zero than  in  later  time
periods.  Since the effective price of consumption is low relative to future periods,
the initial  level of consumption rises relative to  the old steady state.  Since the
money supply is constant,  the  cash in advance constraint  implies that  S must
fall, i.e. the exchange rate appreciates.  This illustrates the importance  of the link
between consumption and money demand in determining exchange rate dynamics.
An attack will happen at time 0 only if consumption and real balances fall enough
to drive government debt to a value greater than  or equal to T.
4.4.  Sensitivity  Analysis
Table 2 describes the effect of perturbations  to the Korean benchmark parameter
values on the timing of a speculative attack  and the present value of seignorage
revenues. Four key results emerge here. First, if the increase in the deficit reflects
a rise in government purchases rather  than an increase in transfers,  then t* falls.
The reason for this  is as follows. In the benchmark model, time  0 consumption
rises by 2 percent relative to its initial steady state  level. Correspondingly, there
is an increase in the demand for money and a reduction in the government's debt.
Other things equal, the reduction in bo  - fo delays the time at which bt  - ft  reaches
its  threshold  level, T.  Because of the rise  in future  government  purchases,  the
household's wealth declines relative to its initial steady state  value. Consequently
time  0 consumption does not rise by as much as in the benchmark  model.  Now
c is roughly equal to the  initial steady state  level of consumption,  c, and  there
is no initial improvement in the government's debt position.  Other  things equal,
19We  also  experimented  with setting Mo = M, as well as chosing  Mo so that the government's
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. These perturbations made very little difference  to
the results.
23this implies bt - ft  will reach IQ  more quickly than  in the benchmark case. Note
that  seignorage revenues also fall relative to  the benchmark  case.  This  occurs
primarily because the fall in the household's wealth leads to a decline in c which
reduces the flow of seignorage revenues (,c)  after T.
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
t*  Present Value of Seignorage
Baseline  2.27  0.25
Constant  transfers  1.60  0.24
a = 5  2.82  0.25
T =  10  9.44  0.16
# =  0.10  2.64  0.25
MT/M  = 2  1.10  0.40
/1  = 0.12  2.11  0.45
Second, a decrease in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution  to  1/5 (a =
5) increases t*.  This  reflects a greater  desire on the  part  of the  household to
have a  smooth  consumption  path.  There  is also  a small decline in  seignorage
revenues which results from a lower level of c. Third, a rise in T increases t* and
reduces the present  value of seignorage revenues.  The latter  happens  because
positive seignorage revenues are generated only when the new monetary policy is
implemented.  Fourth, an increase in IF increases Vt  and reduces the present value
of seignorage revenues. The basic reason for the rise in t* is that  it takes longer
for government debt to  hit the threshold level associated with  abandoning fixed
exchange rates.  The impact on seignorage revenues is more subtle. Recall that no
seignorage revenues are collected between t* and T, i.e. fT  e-rt (rht +  7rtmt)dt  = 0,
so that  the increase in t* has no direct impact on the present value of seignorage
revenues. As it turns out, the decline in seignorage is caused by the fall in money
demand,  M-M*,  that  occurs when the government debt jumps to its threshold
24level IF at  Vt. The  higher  is  F, the  larger  is the  decline  in money  demand  and  the
greater  is the  loss in seignorage  revenue  at  t*.2O
A  potential  shortcoming  of the  experiments  reported  in  Table  2 is that  they
do  not  hold  seignorage  revenues  constant.  We  now  consider  the  results  of ex-
periments  in which  monetary  policy  is adjusted  to  ensure  that  the  government's
intertemporal  budget  constraint  is satisfied.  Table  3a reports  results  when  mone-
tary  policy  is adjusted  via  changes  in MT,  while Table  3b corresponds  to the  case
in which  ,y is adjusted.
Consider  first  the  results  of perturbing  the  benchmark  values  of u and  T,  as
well as assuming  that  the rise in prospective  deficits reflects  a rise in future  govern-
ment  purchases.  Comparing  Tables  2 and  3 we see that  very  small  adjustments
in  monetary  policy  are  necessary  to  compensate  for  the  changes  in  seignorage
revenues  associated  with  these  perturbations  of the  benchmark  model.  As a con-
sequence  the  analogue  values of t* in the  three  tables  are  very  similar.
Next  we consider  how  uncertainty  about  0 affects  the  time  of the  speculative
attack.  Table  3a presents  results  for  0 =  0.1 and  0  =  0.4.  Note  that  the  time  of
the  attack  is relatively  insensitive  to  0, ranging  from  2.08 to  2.39.  In contrast  bL
ranges  from  0.05821 to  0.1081.  Table  3b presents  results  for  0 =  .23 and  ¢ =  0.27.
We considered  this  narrow  range  of variation  for 0 because,  in our  model economy,
the  government  cannot  raise more  than  3 percent  of GDP  in seignorage  through  a
jump  in the  money  supply  at  time  T.  Note  that  both  Vt and  MT/M  are relatively
sensitive  to  variations  in  0.  But  it  is still  the  case  tF.at  the  attack  continues  to
take  place  before  T  in  all  these  experiments:  t* ranges  from  a  low of 2.06 to  a
high  of 2.58.
20There  are  two  offsetting  effects  associated  with  higher  values  of  T:  (i) t* is increasing  in T
so that  the  loss  of  seignorage  revenue  at  t*  is discounted  more  heavily,  and  (ii)  a higher  value
of vI  is associated  with  a larger  jump  in  money  demand  at  T.  In  our  benchmark  models,  these
effects  are  outweighed  by the  effect  discussed  in the  text.
25Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis
Policy Variable that  Adjusts to Keep Seignorage Constant
a) p  b) MT/M
MT/M  =  1.1  t*  A  j  ==  0.08  t*  MT/M
Seignorage = 0.25  Seignorage = 0.25
Baseline  2.27  0.08  Baseline  2.27  1.10
'lYansfers = 0  1.59  0.0824  Transfers = 0  1.43  1.14
a  = 5  2.82  0.0801  f = 5  2.82  1.10
T  = 10  9.32  0.1124  T  =  10  8.33  2.13
= 0.10  2.08  0.0521  0 = 0.23  2.58  1.04
=  0.40  2.39  0.1081  0  =  0.27  2.06  1.16
We now study  the  sensitivity  of our results  to  the  threshold  parameter  AP.
Regardless of the  particular  threshold rule that  the  government adopts,  its  in-
tertemporal  budget constraint  must hold.  As discussed above, an  increase in 1
reduces seignorage revenues.  The government must  compensate  for the  loss of
these revenues by either raising MT  or ,t. Figure 3 depicts the time of the attack
and the  adjustment  in monetary policy as T  varies from 0.04 to  0.15.  Panel A
pertains  to the  case where MT  is fixed and the adjustment  occurs via A. Panel
B refers to  the  case where  [u  is held fixed and the  adjustment  occurs  via  MT.
The key points  to  note are as follows. First,  regardless of how monetary  policy
is adjusted,  t* is an increasing function of IF. Basically, this reflects the fact that
the government can delay the date of the speculative attack by borrowing more
resources.  Second, both  MT  and  ,u are increasing functions of 4'.  It  turns  out
that  as MT  increases, the peak rate  of inflation in time interval 2 also increases.
Consequently the cost of delaying the  attack when monetary  policy adjusts  via
an increase in MT  is higher inflation during the transition  to the new steady state
of the economy.  As ,t  increases, so too  does the  steady state  rate  of inflation.
We conclude that  the  price for delaying a speculative attack  is a higher rate  of
inflation in the future.  This suggests that  the key issue is not whether govern-
26ments can borrow to  fend off speculative attacks,  but  whether  they should.  To
examine this issue we proceed in two steps.  First, we briefly consider the equilib-
rium of our model when the only constraint faced by the government is (2.8), its
intertemporal  budget constraint.  In Section 5, we discuss the optimal policy for
the government to pursue.
4.5.  The  Present  Value  Rule
We now consider the  equilibrium of the  model when the  government operates
under a present value rule, i.e.  (2.8) is the only constraint  that  the government
faces. We proceed by asking the question:  what  is the maximal value of P  con-
sistent  with  (2.8)?  In one sense we have already  answered this question.  Given
the  parameters  of monetary  policy  (MT and ,u), there  is a unique P  such that
(2.8) holds, so that  the present value rule can always be described ex post  as a
threshold rule on government debt.
Suppose that  we fix one of the monetary policy parameters,  say it. For every
value of MT  there exists a value I  such that  (2.8) holds. We can ask the question:
what  is the value of MT  that  maximizes T?  For our benchmark  case we obtain
roughly MT/M = 10.2  The associated values P and t* are 0.48 and 2.91, respec-
tively. Alternatively we could fix MT  and seek the value of ,l  that  maximizes I.
We did not pursue this experiment because it yields extreme results in our model:
at the cost of hyperinflation the government could delay the attack for a very long
(but finite) period of time.  This is because the government can seize all private
wealth by generating sufficiently high inflation. It's  ability to do so is an artifact
of two assumptions which we make in our model: the cash in advance constraint
applies only to consumption, and output  is exogenous.
21This  is the  value  of IQ that  satisfies  (2.8)  when  MT  =  10M.  Farther  increases  in  MT  lead
to  very  small  changes  in 4'.
27We conclude by noting that  Figure 3 and the results of this  section convey a
common message: changes in the threshold rule, IF, do not affect the inevitability
of the speculative attack,  only its  timing and  how much monetary  policy must
be adjusted to balance the government's budget. A government can substantially
delay the collapse of a fixed exchange rate  regime by borrowing but  only at the
cost of higher future inflation. Because of this, it is not obvious that  a government
should borrow to delay an attack, even if it can. We now address the question of
what  monetary policy should the govermnent pursue.
5.  Optimal  Monetary  Policy
This section demonstrates  that  the optimal monetary  policy in our economy is
to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime as soon as new information about the
deficit arrives. The required seignorage revenues should be raised by an increase
in MO  and/or  setting the growth rate of money to a constant,  p. This  monetary
policy succeeds in  balancing the government's  intertemporal  budget  constraint
without  inducing distortions into the economy. 22 This  result follows from three
features of our model: output is exogenous, the cash in advance constraint applies
only to consumption, and seignorage is rebated  to the households.
To demonstrate  the optimality of the proposed policy, suppose that  the gov-
ernment  could finance the increase in the present value of the deficit using lump
sum taxes.  The  equilibrium under  this  financing strategy  cannot  be improved
upon:  the fixed exchange rate  could be maintained  and inflation would continue
to be  zero.  Note that  since tax  revenue are rebated  lump sum to  households,
consumption will remain at its initial steady state level, c.
We now prove the optimality  of our candidate  monetary  policy by showing
22Koenig (1987) and Rebelo and Xie (1999) prove analogous  results for a closed economy
model.
28that  it supports the same allocation as that  which obtains when the government
raises to  lump sum taxes.  Recall that  the optimal behavior  of consumption is
dictated  by equation  (2.6).  It  follows that  if  7rt is constant,  consumption  will
also be  constant.  Since seignorage revenues are rebated  to  the  household,  the
intertemporal  budget constraint  is unaffected and consumption will still equal c.
To finance the increase in the present value of the deficit it must be the case that:
M-(Mo-  M)  + j  ert(rtmt  + rht)dt =  0.  (5.1)
The first term represents seignorage collected from increasing the money supply
to  Mo at time 0. The integral term reflects seignorage obtained  from the future
growth rate of money. Relation (5.1) implies that  Mo and ,u must satisfy:
- (Mo-M)  + mc/r=.
Since this is feasible, the proposed policy supports  the optimal  equilibrium allo-
cation.
One important  caveat to  the preceding discussion is that  it  abstracts  from
nominal rigidities in prices and wages as well as from non-indexed domestic debt
and unhedged loans denominated in foreign currency.  These aspects can clearly
affect optimal monetary  policy and the optimal time to  abandon fixed exchange
rates.  The key point of the preceding discussion is to  emphasize that  there  are
clear costs to  delaying the  adjustment  of monetary  policy.  In  our  model, the
cost is the distortion  of consumption decisions induced by  the fact  that  lower
inflation now is purchased at the price of higher inflation in the future.  The more
a  government borrows  to  delay a speculative  attack,  i.e.  the  higher is  IF, the
higher are these costs. In this sense, the ability to borrow from abroad to delay a
speculative attack actually  reduces welfare.
296.  Empirical  Evidence
This section presents  evidence to  assess the empirical plausibility  of our inter-
pretation  of the recent Asian  currency crisis.  Specifically, we offer evidence in
support of two key assumptions iin our model:  (i) large losses in the banking sector
were associated with  increases in governments' prospective deficits, and  (ii) the
public knew that  banks were in trouble before the exchange rate crises.
Some Background Information
Figure 4 plots exchange rates of various Asian countries from July 1995 through
May 1998. To provide a frame of reference, vertical lines are drawn at what we
refer to  as the crisis dates.  These correspond to the first instance in which there
were historically large devaluations or depreciations of the currency in question.
Table 4 presents  the  cumulative depreciation  rates  of various  Asian currencies
from the crisis dates to May 1998. It is evident that  the experience of the crisis
countries was very different from that  of the non-crisis countries  (Hong Kong,
Singapore and Taiwan).
Table 4:  Cumulative Depreciation Rates (May 1998)
IDN  MYS  THA  KOR  PHL  HKG  SGP  TWN
77%*  35%*  36%*  34%**  32%*  0%*  12%***  13%**
* from  July  97 ** from  Oct.  97 ***  from Aug  97
As further background, Table 5 presents the annual growth rate  of real GDP,
the  official CPI  inflation rates  and the  fiscal surpluses for the  Asian countries,
Japan  and the U.S, over the period 1995-1997. Note that  there are no dramatic
differences between the crisis and non-crisis countries.  The crises certainly could
not  have been predicted  on the  basis of large and/or  growing pre  .crisis fiscal
30deficits in the crisis countries. We refer the reader to Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini
(1998a), IMF (1998) and Lane et al (1999) for more comprehensive surveys of the
pre crisis situation  in Asia.
Table 5: Macroeconomic Fundamentals
Real GDP Growth  CPI Inflation Rates  Fiscal Surplus
(% of GDP)
1995  1996  1997  1995  1996  1997  1995  1996  1997
Indonesia  8.2  8.0  5.0  9.0  6.6  11.6  0.8  1.4  1.9
Korea  8.9  7.1  5.9  4.7  4.9  6.6  0.4  0.3  -0.5
Malaysia  9.5  8.6  7.3  3.2  3.3  2.9  3.8  4.2  2.8
Philippines  4.8  5.7  5.1  11.0  5.2  6.1  -1.4  -0.4  -1.0
Thailand  8.7  6.4  0.0  7.5  4.8  7.7  2.6  1.6  -1.1
Hong Kong  3.9  4.9  5.3  7.0  6.6  5.2  -0.3  2.2  3.8
Singapore  8.7  7.0  7.6  0.9  2.0  2.0  2.7  2.8  1.8
Taiwan  6.0  5.7  6.9  4.6  2.5  -0.5  0.4  0.2  0.2
Japan  1.5  3.9  0.9  -0.1  0.1  1.7  -3.6  -1.1  -0.2
USA  2.0  2.8  3.8  2.8  2.9  2.3  -1.9  -1.1  -0.2
The Size of the Government's Implicit Liabilities
We now discuss the impact of the banking crises on the governments' potential
liabilities. We proceed in two steps. First, we provide evidence based on estimates
of loan default rates prior to the crises. Second, we discuss the size of government
outlays in  Korea,  Thailand,  Indonesia and  Malaysia associated  with  efforts to
reorganize their financial sectors.
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a) provide estimates on loan default rates
in Asia prior to the crises. These are summarized in the first columns of Tables 6
and 7. Note the sharp difference  between default rates in the crisis and non-crisis
countries.  In the former they range from a low of 14 percent  in the Philippines
to a high of 19 percent in Thailand.  In all of the non-crisis countries the ratio of
non-performing loans to total loans is roughly 4 percent.  Using these default rates
31and data on total  credit to domestic enterprises and financial institutions,  we can
generate a rough estimate of the government's total  implicit liabilities stemming
from guarantees to the financial sector. 23




Non-  Domestic  % of
Perform.  Enterprises  %  f  % of  1997
Loans  and  MB  1997  Central
(% of  Financial  GDP**  Gov't.
all loans)  Institutions*  Revenue"
(6/97)
Indonesia  17  343  129.6  9.4  63.0
Korea  16  589  454.1  22.1  103.7
Malaysia  16  403  88.8  23.3  98.3
Philippines  14  1365  84.5  7.8  41.1
Thailand  19  7912  289.6  30.2  176.7
Hong Kong  4  2223  91.6  6.6  33.6
Singapore  4  160  35.0  4.4  11.8
Taiwan  4  12157  26.8  6.0  50.0
*For Indonesia  and Korea, expressed  in trillions of local currency units.
For all others, in billions  of local currency units
"**Estimates.
Columns  2, 3 and  4 of Table 6 report  total  non-performing bank  loans as
a percentage of the monetary  base, real output  and central government revenue,
respectively. Table 7 reports the analogue percentages for the liabilities associated
with non-bank foreign borrowing. Note that  regardless of which measure we use,
Korea and Thailand exhibit high levels of total implicit liabilities. For example, in
23Our  data on  domestic  lending  are from  the IMF  International  Financial  Statistics.  We  have
attempted,  as  best as  possible,  to net  out lending  from  one  type  of  financial  institution  to another
(for  example,  lending  by a deposit  money  bank  to some  other  type of  financial  intermediary).
32Korea, the ratio of total non-performing loans to real GDP (obtained by summing
the entries in the fifth columns of Table 6 and Table 7) is roughly 25 percent.  This
is the number we used to calibrate our model. In the case of Thailand,  this ratio
equals 30 percent.




Non-  Private  % of
Perform.  Sector  %  f  % of  1997
Loans  Borrowing  MB  1997  Central
(%  of  from  GDP**  Gov't.
all loans)  Abroad*  Revenue**
(6/97)
Indonesia  17  92  34.6  2.5  16.8
Korea  16  23  18.0  0.9  4.1
Malaysia  16  19  4.1  1.1  4.5
Philippines  14  134  8.3  0.8  4.0
Thailand  19  343  12.6  1.3  7.7
Hong Kong  4  198  8.2  0.6  3.0
Singapore  4  12  2.6  0.3  0.9
Taiwan  4  88  0.2  0.0  0.4
*For Indonesia and Korea, expressed in trillions of local currency units.
For the others,  in billions of local currency units.
**Estimates.
The previous two tables summarize information on default  rates and implicit
liabilities prior  to  the  currency crisis.  J.P.Morgan  (1998) has  estimated  non-
performing loans as a percentage of total  loans and  GDP  in Indonesia,  Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand,  as of June 1998. In addition  they provide estimates  of
the  amount  of capital,  as a percent  of GDP, needed to  restore bank  capital to
the 8% Bank of International  Settlement's  Capital Adequacy Requirement  level.
33Their estimates assume 60% recovery rates on non-performing loans and no losses
to depositors.  This information is contained in Table 8.
Table 8: Post-crisis Estimates of Non-Performing Loans
and Recapitalization Requirements
Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Thailand
Non-performing Loans
(Percent of Total Loans)  50  30  25  30
(Percent of GDP)  37.5  49.5  41.25  30
Recapitalization Need*
(Percent of GDP)  30  30  22  30
Comparing Tables 6 and  7 with Table 8, we see a dramatic  increase in the
magnitude of non-performing loans relative to the pre-crisis estimates.  From the
perspective  of our  theory  the  post  crisis estimates  are  at  least  as relevant  as
the pre crisis estimates, since these are tied to the current  liabilities of the crisis
governments. Notice also that,  with the exception of Malaysia, the recapitalization
needs as a percentage of GDP all exceed our benchmark value of 0.
A central assumption of our model is that  the crises governments will bear the
burden  of the recapitalization.  Various studies have concluded that  this in fact
the  case.  See  for  example  J.P.  Morgan  (1998,  page  12),  which  argues  that  "...
the burden  of absorbing banks'  bad loans will increasingly fall on governments.
To some extent,  this has already happened in countries where the central bank's
lender of last resort  activities have effectively put the government in control of a
large number of banks - notably in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand."
In a previous version of this paper we briefly reviewed the plans of the different
countries as of the last quarter of 1998 to finance the costs associated with their
failing bank systems.  Consistent with J.P.  Morgan (1998, page 12) we concluded
that  the crisis governments have little room left to cut spending or raise taxes, at
34least  in  the  near  term.2 4 Table  9 which  summarizes  the  assistance  given  to  the
crises  countries  by the  international  community,  is consistent  with  this  view.  Note
that  for  the  countries  where  the  crises  was most  serve,  Indonesia,  Korea  and  the
Philippines,  the  magnitude  of the  aid  was very  large,  17,  12.4 and  10.8 per  cent
of GDP,  respectively.  Granted,  the  international  community  expects  that  much
of this  aid  will be  repaid.  And  it  is very  difficult  to  quantify  the  value  of the
transfer  implicit  in  the  below  market  rates  at  which  these  loans  are  made.  Still
the  large  magnitude  of the  assistance  programs  is  consistent  with  the  view  the
affected  governments  were not  in  a  position  to  make  fiscal  adjustments  quickly
enough  to  make  credible  a  commitment  not  to  monetize  the  prospective  deficits
associated  with  their  failing  banking  systems.
Table  9:  Assistance  from  International  Community
(%  of GDP)
IMF  Multilateral*  Bilateral  Total
Indonesia  4.6  3.7  8.7  17.0
Korea  4.5  3.0  5.0  12.4
Phillipines  1.7  1.7
Thailand  2.5  1.7  6.7  10.8
*World Bank  and  Asian  Development  Bank
Source:  Garcia  (1998)
We now present  evidence  on the  role that  central  banks  played  in supporting
financial  institutions  after  the  currency  crises.  Figure  5  displays  central  bank
credit  to  deposit  money  banks,  expressed  as a  ratio  of the  monetary  base,  from
1995 on.  With  the  exception  of the  Philippines,  this  ratio  increased  dramatically
after  the  crises.  For  example,  in Korea  the  ratio  climbed  from  roughly  one to  3
and half times  the base,  while in Thailand  it increased  from less than  10 percent  to
24In a previous version of this paper we briefly reviewed  the plans of the different countries
as of the last quarter of 1998  to finance  the costs associated  with their failing bank systems.
35roughly  50 percent  of the  base.  We do not have  detailed  information  on how these
loans were backed.  But  presumably,  if the  quality  of the  assets  of these  banks  had
been  high,  there  would  have been  no banking  crisis to start  with  and  no  need for
central  bank  lending.  This  observation  suggests  that  these  loans  represent,  to  a
large  extent,  subsidies  to  the  financial  sector.
Were  the Banking  Crises  a Surprise?
We now consider  whether  private  agents  anticipated  the  state  of the  banking
system  prior  to the  currency  crises.  Corsetti,  Pesenti  and  Roubini  (1998a),  IMF
(1998) and  Lane  et al  (1999) discuss  the  fragile state  of the  financial  sectors  in the
crisis  countries  prior  to  the  recent  speculative  attacks.  In  addition  they  provide
several  example  of bank  failures  and  reorganizations  that  occurred  prior  to  the
crises.
While  their  discussion  is very  informative,  it  leaves open  the  question  of how
markets  aggregated  the  information  contained  in the  episodes  that  Corsetti,  Pe-
senti  and  Roubini  (1998a),  IMF  (1998)  and  Lane  et  al  (1999) discuss.  To inves-
tigate  this  issue  we obtained  daily  data  on  stock  market  indices  of the  value  of
the  banking  or  financial  sectors  and  the  industrial  or  commercial  sectors  in  the
crisis countries.  We then  constructed  monthly  indices  of the  market  value  of the
financial  sectors  in these  countries  as well indices  of nonfinancial  sectors.2 5 These
are presented  in Figure  6 and  summarized  in Table  10.  Note  that  in Korea,  Thai-
land  and  to a lesser  extent  the  Philippines  and  Malaysia,  the  value  of the financial
sectors  had  been  declining  well before the  currency  crises.
25We used the following  Bloomberg  series to construct our monthly banking/financial  sec-
tor  indices:  Indonesia-JAKFIN,  Korea-KOSPBANK,  Malaysia-KLFIN,  Philippines-PFINC,
Thailand-SETFIN, Hong Kong-AOF, Singapore-SESFIN,  Taiwan Province-TWSEBKI.  The
Bloomberg series used to  construct monthly industrial or commercial sector indices were:
Indonesia-JAKMANU,  Korea-KOSPMAN,  Malaysia-KLPRO,  Philippines-PCOM, Thailand-
SETCOM, Hong Kong-AON,  Singapore-SESIND,  Taiwan Province-TWSESTEE.
36Table  10: Changes  in Banking  Sector  Stock  Market  Values
% Decline  in  % Decline Peak  Crisis  Banking  Index Banking  Index  Manufacturing  Index
Korea  Aug.  3, 1991  Oct.  29,  1997  67%  64%
Thailand  Jan.  4, 1994  July  2, 1997  92%  80%
Philippines  Feb.  17,  1997  July  11, 1997  34%  14%
Malaysia  Feb.25,  1997  July  11, 1997  26%  8%
For Korea  the  decline  in the  banking  index  from its  peak  (August  3, 1991) to
the  date  of the  currency  crisis  (October  29,  1997) was  67 percent.  The  analogue
decline  in  the  ratio  of  the  banking  index  to  the  manufacturing  index  was  64
percent.  In the  case  of Thailand  the  decline  in the  finance  index  from  its  peak
(January  4,  1994) to  the  date  of the  crisis  (July  2,  1997)  was  92 percent.  The
analogue  decline  in the  ratio  of the  finance  index  to  the  commerce  index  was 80
percent.  In the  Philippines,  the  peak  in the  finance  index took  place  on February
17,  1997.  This  series  declined  by  34 percent  between  this  date  and  the  date  at
which  their  currency  crisis began  in earnest  (July  11, 1997).  The  peak  to  trough
decline  in  the  ratio  of the  finance  index  to  the  commerce  index  was  14 percent.
Finally  for  Malaysia  the  peak  in  the  finance  index  took  place  on  February  25,
1997. This  series  declined  26 percent  between  this  date  and  the  date  of the  crisis
(July  11,  1997).  The  peak  to  trough  decline  in the  ratio  of the  finance  index  to
the  industrial  index  was 8 percent.
Based  on  this  evidence  we conclude  that  private  agents  in these  four  countries
understood  the  potentially  fragile nature  of their  banking  systems.  This  also sug-
gests  that  markets  anticipated  that  the  government  would bail  out only depositors
and  creditors  of the  banks.  Had  they  anticipated  that  the  banks  would  be  fully
insured  by  the  government,  the  equity  value  of banks  would  not  have  changed,
other  things  being  equal.
37Finally  we note  that  examining  nominal  interest  rate  movements  prior  to the
crises  could  be useful  for  assessing  private  agent's  expectations  about  the  timing
of the  speculative  attack.  Our  model  predicts  that  nominal  yields  on  bonds  of
maturity  greater  than  t* ought  to  rise  once  agents  receive  information  about  the
increase  in prospective  deficits.  In future  work,  we intend  to  pursue  this  avenue
of research.2 6 In so doing,  we face three  serious problems:  (i) as far as we can tell,
the  available  data  pertain  primarily  to short  term  loans,  typically  of duration  less
than  one year,  (ii) there  was active  government  intervention  in the  crisis countries
aimed  at  affecting  short  term  interest  rates,  and  (iii)  there  were  capital  controls
in  some  of  these  countries,  e.g.  Korea.  Finally,  it  seems  important  to  enrich
our  model  (see below)  before  formally  investigating  its  detailed  implications  for
nominal  interest  rates.
7.  Conclusions
This  paper  focused  on  the  role played  by  large  prospective  deficits  in  the  Asian
currency  crisis.  Our  basic  argument  is simple:  absent  the  political  will to  raise
taxes  or cut  spending,  governments  have  to  resort  to  seignorage  revenues  to  pay
for  the  bailout  of the  banking  system.  In  a world  of forward  looking  agents  this
makes  a  currency  crisis  inevitable.  In  versions  of our  model  calibrated  to  the
Korean  and  Thai  economies,  the  collapse  of the  fixed exchange  rate  happens  after
agents  learn  that  future  deficits  will rise  but  before the  government  implements
its new monetary  policy.  Under  this  scenario  standard  macroeconomic  aggregates
such as past  inflation  and  fiscal deficits are not useful  in predicting  currency  crises.
26Cline and Barnes (1997) analyze  trends in spreads on U.S. dollar denominated  Eurobonds.
They conclude  that these spreads fell in emerging  markets, including  Southeast Asia, between
mid-1995  and mid-1997. While useful this information does not bear directly on the issues
raised  in  this  paper.  Since  the  bonds  in question  are  dollar  denominated,  the  spreads  reflect
default  risk  rather  than  expected  depreciation.  Similar  comments  apply  to  Park  and  Rhee's
(1998)  analysis  of the  yield  spread  on  Korean  Development  Bank  global  bonds.
38In this  limited  sense our  model rationalizes  claims  that  the  Asian  crises were hard
to  predict.
Our  model suggests  that  we focus our  empirical  analysis  on  information  useful
for forecasting  prospective  deficits.  This  is why  we studied  the  state  of the  Asian
banking  system  prior  to  the  crisis.  We found  evidence  consistent  with  the  view
that  agents  knew  that  banks  were in trouble  before  the  crisis  and  that  the  size of
the  financial  sector  bailout  would  be  large.  This  evidence  does  not  rule  out  the
possibility  that  the  Asian  currency  crises  were multiple  equilibrium  phenomena.
But  it  does suggest  a simple  explanation  based  on fundamentals.
We  conclude  by  highlighting  some  important  shortcomings  of our  analysis.
First,  in our model the  state  of the  banking  system  is costlessly  revealed  to agents
at  a  particular  point  in  time.  In  reality,  obtaining  this  information  took  time
and  resources.  Moreover,  information  about  banking  problems  in  one  country
may  have  conveyed  information  about  banking  systems  in  other  countries.  We
suspect  that  understanding  the  precise timing  and  sequencing  of currency  attacks
will require  an  analysis  of these  information  dynamics.  Second,  we modeled  the
decision  of when  to  abandon  fixed exchange  rates  with  a simple  threshold  rule on
government  debt.  In practice  this  decision  is shaped  by  political  considerations.
Modeling  these  political  aspects  is likely to lead to insights  regarding  the timing  of
speculative  attacks.  Third,  to isolate  the  role of prospective  deficits we abstracted
from  nominal  rigidities.  These  rigidities  will almost  surely  have  an impact  on the
nature  of optimal  monetary  policy.  Finally,  we did  not  address  the  issue  of how
the  collapse  of financial  intermediaries  affects future  output  and  tax  revenues.  We
took  as given  that  in the  state  of the  world  where  banks  collapsed,  governments
would  find it difficult  to raise  tax  revenues.  In future  work  we intend  to study  in
detail  the  role played by the  financial  sector  in generating  the  persistent  recessions
that  are  often  associated  with  currency  collapses.
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428.  Appendix
The problem of the representative household is to maximize (2.2) subject to (2.3)
- (2.5) by choice of time paths  for Ct,  mt,  bt and dt, given a known time path  for
lrt.  The current-valued Hamiltonian associated with this problem is:
H  = l  _  ~+ At[y  + r(bt + dt) + v  -Ct  - r - 7tMtZt]  +
Otzt  +  wt(mt  - Ct)
where  zt =  mt
The first order conditions to the problem are given by:
Ct  =  Ait +  wt,
At  =  Ot,
\t  =  (p-r)At  =  O,
bt  =  Otp  + Atrt  - Wt
These equations imply (2.6) in the main text.
43Figure 1: Response  to News about an Increase in Prospective
Deficits
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Each point represents a value, at the end of a month, of 100XS 61 97/1S  where S, is the
number of local currency  units per U.S. dollar at date t.  Vertical lines represents  crisis
dates determnined  by the first month in which a large depreciation occurred. Source:  IFS.Figure 5
Central Bank Credit Extended  to Banks Relative to Base Money
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Each graph plots the value of credit extended  by the central  bank to comnmercial  banks
relative to the monetary base.  Source:  IFS except for Malaysia, for which the source is
Bank Negara Malaysia.Figure 6
Stock Market Indices and Crisis Dates
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-,  91-  0  ~  i  ~  i  4~  ~  ~~  0%0  0  -The thin line represents  the level of the stock market index for the finance sector (banking
for Korea). The thick line represents  the level of this index relative to a stock market
index for the industrial (Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Malaysia, Singapore),  manufacturing
(Korea), commerce (Philippines,  Thailand)  or steel (Taiwan) sector. The vertical lines
represent crisis dates for each country. Source: Bloomberg, Note the different horizontal
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